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PREFACE
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) meeting to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009 
(the 15th Conference of the Parties, COP15) will be a critical step in 
developing a global response to the threat of climate change caused 
by human activities. The primary scientific input to those negotiations 
is the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), published in 20071. The IPCC report has already 
been instrumental in increasing both public and political awareness of 
the societal risks associated with unchecked emission of greenhouse 
gases. 
 
Since the production of the IPCC report, new knowledge has emerged that 
furthers understanding of the impacts of human influence on the climate 
and the response options and approaches that are available to tackle this 
complex issue. To bring this new knowledge together, the International 
Alliance of Research Universitiesi organised an international scientific 
congress on climate change, Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges 
and Decisions, which was held in Copenhagen from 10-12 March 2009. 
Participation in the Congress was open to all. Most of the approximately 
2500 people attending the Congress were researchers, many of whom 
have also been contributors to the IPCC reports. Participants came from 
nearly 80 different countries and contributed with more than 1400 
scientific presentations. Abstracts for all of the scientific presentations 
made can be found at www.iop.org/EJ/volume/1755-1315/6, 
and a transcript of the closing plenary session can be found at 
environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/opinion/39126.
 
This synthesis report presents an up-to-date overview of a broad range 
of research relevant to climate change – including fundamental climate 
science, the impacts of a changing climate on society and environment, 
and the many tools and approaches available to deal effectively with the 
challenge of climate change. The report has been produced by a writing 
team comprised of members of the Scientific Steering Committee for 
the IARU Congress and individuals invited to give the writing team 
academic and geographic breadth. It is based on the 16 plenary talks 
given at the Congress as well as input from over 80 chairs and co-
chairs of the 58 parallel sessions held at the Congress. The names of 
the plenary speakers and the chairs and co-chairs of the parallel sessions 
can be found on the inside cover of this volume. The writing team 
has, in addition to presentations at the Congress, drawn upon recent 
publications in the scientific literature to create this synthesis. 
This report has been critically reviewed by representatives of the Earth 
System Science Partnership (ESSP)ii, by the parallel session chairs and 
co-chairs, and by up to four independent researchers from each IARU 
university. This extensive review process has been implemented to ensure 
that the messages contained in the report are solidly and accurately 
based on the new research produced since the last IPCC Report, and 
that they faithfully reflect the most recent work of the international 
climate change research community. 
i IARU (International Alliance of Research Universities): (http://www.iaruni.org/ )
Australian National University, University of California - Berkeley, University of Cambridge, University of 
Copenhagen, ETH Zürich, National University of Singapore, University of Oxford, Peking University, The 
University of Tokyo, Yale University.
ii The ESSP (www.essp.org) is a partnership of the international research programmes World Climate 
Research Programme (WCRP), International Geosphere Biosphere Programme (IGBP), International Human 
Dimensions Programme for Global Change Research (IHDP) and DIVERSITAS, an international programme 
of biodiversity science. 
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ExECUTIVE SUMMARY
Past societies have reacted when they understood that their own 
activities were causing deleterious environmental change by controlling 
or modifying the offending activities. The scientific evidence has now 
become overwhelming that human activities, especially the combustion 
of fossil fuels, are influencing the climate in ways that threaten the 
well-being and continued development of human society. If humanity 
is to learn from history and to limit these threats, the time has come 
for stronger control of the human activities that are changing the 
fundamental conditions for life on Earth. 
To decide on effective control measures, an understanding of how 
human activities are changing the climate, and of the implications of 
unchecked climate change, needs to be widespread among world and 
national leaders, as well as in the public. 
The purpose of this report is to provide, for a broad range of audiences, 
an update of the newest understanding of climate change caused 
by human activities, the social and environmental implications of 
this change, and the options available for society to respond to the 
challenges posed by climate change. 
This understanding is communicated through six key messages:
KEY MESSAGE 1:  
ClImATIC TRENdS
Recent observations show that greenhouse gas emissions and many 
aspects of the climate are changing near the upper boundary of the IPCC 
range of projections. Many key climate indicators are already moving 
beyond the patterns of natural variability within which contemporary 
society and economy have developed and thrived. These indicators 
include global mean surface temperature, sea-level rise, global ocean 
temperature, Arctic sea ice extent, ocean acidification, and extreme 
climatic events. With unabated emissions, many trends in climate will 
likely accelerate, leading to an increasing risk of abrupt or irreversible 
climatic shifts. 
KEY MESSAGE 2:  
SOCIAl ANd ENvIRONmENTAl dISRuPTION
The research community provides much information to support 
discussions on “dangerous climate change”. Recent observations show 
that societies and ecosystems are highly vulnerable to even modest 
levels of climate change, with poor nations and communities, ecosystem 
services and biodiversity particularly at risk. Temperature rises above 2oC 
will be difficult for contemporary societies to cope with, and are likely 
to cause major societal and environmental disruptions through the rest 
of the century and beyond. 
 
KEY MESSAGE 3:  
lONG-TERm STRATEGY: GlObAl TARGETS ANd TImETAblES 
Rapid, sustained, and effective mitigation based on coordinated global 
and regional action is required to avoid “dangerous climate change” 
regardless of how it is defined. Weaker targets for 2020 increase the 
risk of serious impacts, including the crossing of tipping points, and 
make the task of meeting 2050 targets more difficult and costly. Setting 
a credible long-term price for carbon and the adoption of policies that 
promote energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies are central to 
effective mitigation. 
KEY MESSAGE 4:  
EquITY dImENSIONS
Climate change is having, and will have, strongly differential effects on 
people within and between countries and regions, on this generation 
and future generations, and on human societies and the natural world. 
An effective, well-funded adaptation safety net is required for those 
people least capable of coping with climate change impacts, and 
equitable mitigation strategies are needed to protect the poor and most 
vulnerable. Tackling climate change should be seen as integral to the 
broader goals of enhancing socioeconomic development and equity 
throughout the world.
KEY MESSAGE 5:  
INACTION IS INExCuSAblE
Society already has many tools and approaches – economic, 
technological, behavioural, and managerial – to deal effectively with the 
climate change challenge. If these tools are not vigorously and widely 
implemented, adaptation to the unavoidable climate change and the 
societal transformation required to decarbonise economies will not be 
achieved. A wide range of benefits will flow from a concerted effort to 
achieve effective and rapid adaptation and mitigation. These include 
job growth in the sustainable energy sector; reductions in the health, 
social, economic and environmental costs of climate change; and the 
repair of ecosystems and revitalisation of ecosystem services.
KEY MESSAGE 6:  
mEETING THE CHAllENGE
If the societal transformation required to meet the climate change 
challenge is to be achieved, then a number of significant constraints 
must be overcome and critical opportunities seized. These include 
reducing inertia in social and economic systems; building on a growing 
public desire for governments to act on climate change; reducing 
activities that increase greenhouse gas emissions and reduce resilience 
(e.g. subsidies); and enabling the shifts from ineffective governance 
and weak institutions to innovative leadership in government, the 
private sector and civil society. Linking climate change with broader 
sustainable consumption and production concerns, human rights issues 
and democratic values is crucial for shifting societies towards more 
sustainable development pathways.
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LIVING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTRAINTS
The Earth is approximately five billion years old. Humans, however, have 
been on the planet for only 0.004% of that history; modern Homo 
sapiens evolved around 200,000 years ago. Dramatic climate changes 
have occurred in the Earth’s long history. Early humans experienced, 
and a fraction of them survived, some of these dramatic climate events. 
However, only during the last 12,000 years, a period in which the Earth’s 
climate has been comparatively warm and stable, have humans really 
thrived.
During the stable climate conditions of this period, humans discovered 
how to cultivate plants and domesticate animals. These discoveries, 
which occurred about 10,000 years ago and ultimately led to modern 
agriculture, dramatically changed the relationship between humans and 
the planet. They broke an early natural constraint on human numbers, 
and enabled many more people to thrive simultaneously on Earth than 
was possible without control over food availability. 
Presumably, the first farmers were free to farm wherever they wanted 
to. However, when society – many thousands of years later - recognised 
that unchecked agricultural practice and development could be harmful 
for society as a whole, local rules were developed to govern how and 
where agriculture could be carried out. In the same manner, our early 
ancestors probably experienced no restrictions on where they could 
dispose of their waste. When human numbers increased to a certain 
level and the accumulation of waste was recognised as a health or 
pollution problem, rules and technologies were established to manage 
waste disposal. A contemporary example of globally enforced regulation 
is the Montreal Protocol, where the international community in 1987 
agreed to act on scientific evidence that certain industrial gases can lead 
to dangerous depletion of the Earth’s ozone layer. 
In all of these cases, control was only established when there was the 
general acceptance in society that a continued state of non-regulation 
would lead to unacceptable costs. Thus, the history of humanity’s 
relationship with the environment shows that when society learns 
that a certain practice may jeopardise the well-being of its members, 
rules, regulations, and other strategies are established to control the 
offending practice. 
The scientific evidence today overwhelmingly indicates that allowing 
the emission of greenhouse gases from human activities to continue 
unchecked constitutes a significant threat to the well-being and 
continued development of contemporary society. The knowledge 
that human activities are influencing the climate gives contemporary 
society the responsibility to act. It necessitates redefinition of humanity’s 
relationship with the Earth and - for the sake of the well-being of society 
– it requires management of those human activities that interfere 
with the climate. To support development of effective responses, 
however, this knowledge should be widely disseminated outside of 
the scientific community. The purpose of this report is to communicate 
to a broad range of audiences the research community’s most up-to-
date understanding of climate change, its implications, and the actions 
needed to deal with it effectively.
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Recent observations show that greenhouse gas emissions and many aspects of the climate are 
changing near the upper boundary of the IPCC range of projections. Many key climate indicators 
are already moving beyond the patterns of natural variability within which contemporary society and 
economy have developed and thrived. These indicators include global mean surface temperature, sea-
level rise, global ocean temperature, Arctic sea ice extent, ocean acidification, and extreme climatic 
events. With unabated emissions, many trends in climate will likely accelerate, leading to an increasing 
risk of abrupt or irreversible climatic shifts. 
KEY mESSAGE 1
CLIMATIC TRENDS
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in 
20072 that climate change is, without doubt, occurring and that the 
Earth is warming. More importantly, the IPCC concluded that there is 
over 90% probability that this global warming is primarily caused by 
human activities – the most important of these being the emission of 
greenhouse gases and the clearing of natural vegetation. Since 2007, 
reports comparing the IPCC projections of 1990 with observations 
show that some climate indicators are changing near the upper end 
of the range indicated by the projections or, as in the case of sea level 
rise (Figure 1), at even greater rates than indicated by IPCC projections. 
Grasping the significance of such observations requires an understanding 
of climate change that goes beyond the warming of the atmosphere.
The climate is largely controlled by the flows of heat entering and leaving 
the planet and the storage of heat in the various compartments of the 
Earth System - ocean, land, atmosphere, snow/ice. This heat ultimately 
comes from the sun. Only a very small amount of the heat is stored in 
the atmosphere (Figure 2); by far the largest amount of heat stored at 
the Earth’s surface is found in the ocean. The heat flux into the ocean 
proceeds more slowly than into the atmosphere. However, given that 
the ocean stores so much heat, a change in ocean temperature, which 
reflects a change in the amount of heat stored in the ocean, is a better 
indicator of change in the climate than changes in air temperature. 
Figure 3 shows the trend in surface air temperature in recent decades. 
2008 was comparatively cooler than the immediately preceding years, 
primarily because there was a minimum in the cycle of the sun’s magnetic 
activity (sun spot cycle) and a La Niña event in 2007/2008. Nevertheless, 
the long-term trend of increasing temperature is clear and the trajectory 
of atmospheric temperature at the Earth’s surface is proceeding within 
the range of IPCC projections. 
Since the last IPCC report, updated trends in surface ocean temperature 
and heat content have been published4,5. These revised estimates show 
(Figure 4) that the ocean has warmed significantly in recent years. 
Current estimates indicate that ocean warming is about 50% greater 
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Figure 1 
Change in sea level from 1970 to 2008, relative to the sea level at 1990. The solid lines are based on 
observations smoothed to remove the effects of interannual variability (light lines connect data points). 
Data in most recent years are obtained via satellite based sensors. The envelope of IPCC projections is 
shown for comparison; this includes the broken lines as individual projections and the shading as the 
uncertainty around the projections3.
Figure 2
The change in energy content in different components of the Earth System for two periods: 1961-2003 
(blue bars) and 1993-2003 (pink bars)2 (figure 5.4). 
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Figure 3
Changes in global average surface air temperature (smoothed over 15 years) (corrected from 11 in 
the first version og this report) relative to 1990. The blue line represents data from Hadley Center (UK 
Meteorological Office); the red line is GISS (NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, USA) data. The 
broken lines are projections from the IPCC Third Assessment Report, with the shading indicating the 
uncertainties around the projections3 (data from 2007 and 2008 added by Rahmstorf, S.).
Figure 4
Change in ocean heat content since 1951 (observations - black line) with uncertainties (in grey shading), 
relative to the ocean heat content in 19614.
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Changes in the Greenland Ice Sheet
Prof. Dorthe Dahl Jensen, ddj@gfy.ku.dk & Dr. Konrad Steffen, Konrad.Steffen@colorado.edu
BOX 1
Increased melting of the large polar ice sheets contributes to the observed increase 
in sea level. Observations of the area of the Greenland ice sheet that has been at the 
melting point temperature at least one day during the summer period shows a 50% 
increase during the period 1979 to 20086 (see figure). The Greenland region experienced 
an extremely warm summer in 2007. The whole area of south Greenland reached the 
melting temperatures during that summer, and the melt season began 10-20 days earlier 
and lasted up to 60 days longer in south Greenland7. 
In addition to melting, the large polar ice sheets lose mass by ice discharge, which is 
also sensitive to regional temperature. Satellite measurements of very small changes in 
gravity have revolutionised the ability to estimate loss of mass from these processes. The 
second figure shows that the Greenland ice sheet has been losing mass at a rate of 179 Gt/
yr since 2003. This rate of loss corresponds to a contribution to global mean sea level rise of 
0.5 mm/yr; the current total global mean sea level rise is 3.1 mm/yr8. As for melt area, the 
mass loss for the exceptionally warm year of 2007 was very large. The new observations of 
the increasing loss of mass from glaciers, ice caps and the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets 
lead to predictions of global mean sea level rises of 1 m (±0.5 m) during the next century. 
The updated estimates of the future global mean sea level rise are about double the IPCC 
projections from 200728.
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than had been previously reported by the IPCC2. The new estimates 
help to better explain the trend in sea level that has been observed in 
recent decades as most of the sea-level rise observed until recently has 
been the result of thermal expansion of seawater.
The rate of sea-level rise has increased in the period from 1993 to the 
present (Figure 1), largely due to the growing contribution of ice loss from 
Greenland (Box 1) and Antarctica. However, models of the behaviour of 
these polar ice sheets are still in their infancy, so projections of sea-level 
rise to 2100 based on such “process models” are highly uncertain. An 
alternative approach is to base projections on the observed relationship 
between global average temperature rise and sea-level rise over the 
past 120 years, assuming that this observed relationship will continue 
into the future. New estimates based on this approach suggest a sea-
level rise of around a metre or more by 210016 (Opening Session (S. 
Rahmstorf) and session 1). 
Sea-level rise will not stop in 2100. Changes in ocean heat content will 
continue to affect sea-level rise for several centuries at least. Melting 
and dynamic ice loss in Antarctica and Greenland will also continue 
for centuries into the future. Thus, the changes current generations 
initiate in the climate will directly influence our descendents long into 
the future. In fact, global average surface temperature will hardly drop 
in the first thousand years after greenhouse gas emissions are cut to 
zero9,10.
One of the most dramatic developments since the last IPCC Report1 is 
the rapid reduction in the area of Arctic sea ice in summer. In 2007, the 
minimum area covered decreased by about 2 million square kilometres 
as compared to previous years. In 2008, the decrease was almost as 
dramatic11. This decreasing ice coverage is important for climate on a 
larger scale as ice and snow reflect most of the radiation from the sun 
back into the atmosphere while seawater absorbs most of the radiation 
reaching it from the sun. Thus, an ice-free ocean absorbs more heat than 
an ice-covered ocean, so the loss of Arctic sea ice creates a “feedback” 
in the climate system that increases warming. 
 
The major cause of the increasing heat content of the planet’s surface is 
the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere2, 
12 (Figure 5). These gases enhance the “greenhouse effect”, which is a 
well documented and understood physical process in the Earth System - 
like gravity or tides - and which has been known since the 19th century. 
The natural greenhouse effect makes Earth habitable in the first place. 
Greenhouse gases, such as water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) in the atmosphere absorb the heat 
leaving the Earth’s surface, thus retaining more heat near the Earth’s 
surface - in the ocean, land, and atmosphere. Without the existence of 
the natural greenhouse effect, the average temperature on Earth would 
be about -19oC, that is, about 34oC colder than it is today. All planets 
with heat absorbing gases in their atmosphere experience a greenhouse 
effect; the extreme surface temperature (440oC) of Venus, for example, 
can only be explained by the high concentration of CO2 there. 
Changing the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere alters the 
magnitude of the greenhouse effect. Water vapour is the most abundant 
greenhouse gas and makes the greatest contribution to the natural 
greenhouse effect on Earth. Because the atmosphere’s ability to contain 
water vapour is strongly dependent on temperature, the amount of 
water vapour in the atmosphere is regulated by the Earth’s temperature 
itself, increasing as warming occurs. This means that water vapour 
follows and amplifies changes in global temperature that are induced 
by other causes. Human activities have not had a significant direct effect 
on net global flows of water vapour to/from the atmosphere16 (session 
3), although locally they have changed these flows by, for example, 
felling forests or establishing irrigation.
The situation is very different for some of the other greenhouse gases 
where human emissions do have a direct impact. Atmospheric CO2 
as well as methane and nitrous oxide concentrations have increased 
dramatically over recent decades as a result of human activities. Ice 
core and sediment records show that the concentration of all of these 
gases in the atmosphere is now higher than it has been since long 
before modern humans evolved. In fact, the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere has not been substantially higher than it is now for at least 
the last 20 million years of the Earth’s history17. 
The initial warming from increased greenhouse gas concentrations is 
amplified by reinforcing feedbacks. These are processes that are induced 
by climate change and that subsequently drive further warming. In 
addition to the Arctic sea ice and water vapour feedbacks described 
above, a very important feedback is related to natural “carbon sinks” 
- processes that absorb CO2 from the atmosphere. Not all of the CO2 
released into the atmosphere through human activities remains there. 
Over half of the CO2 emitted to the atmosphere by fossil fuel combustion 
and land use change is removed by land and ocean CO2 sinks. The 
fraction of human-driven CO2 emissions removed by these sinks has 
decreased over the last 50 years12, with some evidence that the fraction 
will decrease further over coming decades under high future emissions 
scenarios12 (Box 2). If this weakening of natural CO2 sinks continues, a 
greater fraction of emissions will remain in the atmosphere, requiring 
a greater reduction in emissions to achieve specific targets for the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere.
At smaller scales, one of the most important changes in climate is the 
observed increase in extreme events – heat waves, storms and floods2. 
In addition, regional climate is often directly related to the behaviour of 
specific patterns of climate variability, such as the monsoon systems, and 
these patterns may themselves be influenced by the warming climate16 
(session 3),19. Changes in extreme events and in the patterns of natural 
variability can have dramatic consequences for human societies that 
have become used to or dependent upon long-established patterns of 
temperature, wind and rainfall in specific regions. The next section deals 
with some of the consequences and risks that interference with the 
climate poses for society. 
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The trends in atmospheric concentrations for the greenhouse gases (A) carbon 
dioxide, CO2, in ppm (parts per million) from 1958 to present
13; (B) methane, 
CH4, in ppb (parts per billion) from 1979 to present
14; and (C) nitrous oxide, N2O, 
in ppb (parts per billion) from 1978 to present 2,13,14,15.
A
B
C
The Global Carbon Cycle
Dr. Michael R. Raupach, Michael.Raupach@csiro.com, Prof. Nicolas Gruber, nicolas.gruber@env.ethz.ch  
Dr. Josep G. Canadell, Pep.Canadell@csiro.au 
BOX 2
The global carbon cycle is in strong disequilibrium because of the input of CO2 into 
the atmosphere from fossil fuel combustion and land use change. Fossil fuels presently 
account for about 85% of total emissions, and land use change for 15%. Total 
emissions have grown exponentially at about 2% per year since 1800. However, fossil 
fuel emissions have accelerated since 2000 to grow at about 3.4% per year, an observed 
growth rate that is at the upper edge of the range of growth rates in IPCC scenarios. 
Total CO2 emissions are responsible for 2/3 of the growth of all greenhouse gas radiative 
forcing.
  
Without CO2 sinks, which remove and store CO2 from the atmosphere, the total human 
CO2 emissions since 1800 would have caused atmospheric CO2 to increase from its 
pre-industrial value of 280 ppm to nearly 500 ppm. However, the disequilibrium of 
the carbon cycle causes the vast human input of CO2 to be repartitioned between the 
carbon stores in the atmosphere, land, and oceans. Consequently, land and ocean CO2 
sinks have consistently taken up more than half of total CO2 emissions since 1800 and 
the actual CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere has raised the CO2 concentration to 
only 385 ppm (growing at about 2 ppm per year). However, these natural CO2 sinks are 
vulnerable to climate and land use change: they are highly likely to weaken in the future 
because of several effects including increasing ocean acidification, ocean circulation 
changes, and water, temperature, and nutrient constraints on land CO2 uptake. Also, 
previously inert carbon pools can be mobilised and released into the atmosphere either 
as CO2 or methane, a more potent greenhouse gas. Pools of concern include tropical 
peatland carbon, which is vulnerable to land clearing and drainage, and the large stores 
of organic carbon in Arctic permafrost, which are vulnerable to warming.
Recent work is starting to quantify the amplifying effect of these vulnerabilities on 
climate change. There is increasing confidence that their net result will be to amplify 
the atmospheric CO2 and methane increases to 2100, thence amplifying climate 
change. The amplification factor is ill constrained, and best current estimates range 
from near zero to over 50%. Under the IPCC1 A2 emissions scenario, which predicts 
global warming of about 4oC without carbon-climate feedbacks, an additional 0.1 to 
1.5oC is predicted from the vulnerability of land and ocean sinks. The additional effect 
of accelerated methane and CO2 emissions from thawing permafrost is potentially very 
significant but is not yet quantified.
Observed global fossil-fuel and industrial CO2 emissions
18, compared with averages of 6 
scenario groups from the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (coloured lines) and 
range covered by all individual scenarios (grey shading). Emission data are from two sources: 
The Carbon Dioxide Information and Analysis Center (CDIAC) and the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). Figure updated using the latest available data (www.globalcarbonproject.org) 
since the original publication of this report.  
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The research community provides much information to support discussions on “dangerous climate 
change”. Recent observations show that societies and ecosystems are highly vulnerable to even 
modest levels of climate change, with poor nations and communities, ecosystem services and 
biodiversity particularly at risk. Temperature rises above 2oC will be difficult for contemporary societies 
to cope with, and are likely to cause major societal and environmental disruptions through the rest of 
the century and beyond. 
KEY mESSAGE 2
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISRUPTION
Defining “dangerous climate change” is ultimately a value judgement 
to be made by societies as a whole. At least three different kinds of 
considerations are important: (i) the negative effects to humans and 
ecosystems that occur at various levels of climate change; (ii) the levels of 
negative impacts that societies are willing to tolerate; and (iii) the levels 
of climate change at which so-called tipping points might be crossed, 
where change is no longer linear and reversible, but abrupt, large, and 
potentially irreversible in time frames relevant for contemporary society. 
At present, there seems to be little such discussion and debate16 (session 
39) despite the fact that scientific research provides a wealth of critical 
information relevant to such discussion.
While there is not yet a global consensus on what levels of climate 
change might be defined to be “dangerous”, considerable support20 
has developed for containing the rise in global temperature to a 
maximum of 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This is often referred to as 
“the 2°C guardrail”. IPCC21 as well as more recent scientific research31 
indicate that even with temperature rises less than 2oC, impacts can 
be significant, although some societies could cope with some of these 
impacts through pro-active adaptation strategies. Beyond 2oC, the 
possibilities for adaptation of society and ecosystems rapidly decline 
with an increasing risk of social disruption through health impacts, 
water shortages and food insecurity.
One of the best indicators of the impacts of climate change on societies 
is human health and well-being (Box 3). The observed temperature rise 
to date, about 0.7oC, is already affecting health in many societies; the 
increasing number of extreme weather events, such as heat waves, 
floods, and storms, is leading to a growing toll of deaths and injuries 
from climate-related natural disasters1. Beyond the direct impacts on 
health, climate change also affects the underlying determinants of 
health – quantity and quality of food, water resources, and ecological 
control of disease vectors16 (session 14).
The nexus between climate change, human health and water systems 
is particularly strong. As for health, the impacts of climate change on 
water systems are already apparent in many parts of the world, with 
accelerating impacts likely for several decades irrespective of future 
agreements to abate emissions of greenhouse gases (Box 4). For 
example, droughts and drying are leading to social instability, food 
insecurity and long-term health problems in some regions now as 
livelihoods are damaged or destroyed16 (session 14). Such impacts often 
drive a strategy of short-term survival at the expense of longer-term 
1 2 3 4 5
0
20
40
60
80
100
Hurricane Category
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e 
In
cr
ea
se
+1 m/s
+3 m/s
+5 m/s
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Maximum Winds (m/s)
N
u
m
b
er
Cat5
1 2 3 4 5
0
20
40
60
80
100
Hurricane Category
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e 
In
cr
ea
se
+1 m/s
+3 m/s
+5 m/s
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Maximum Winds (m/s)
N
u
m
b
er
Cat5
Figure 6
(A) The numbers of North Atlantic tropical cyclones for each maximum wind speed shown on the 
horizontal axis. The most intense (Category 5) tropical cyclones have maximum wind speeds of 70 m/s or 
greater. (B) The proportional increase by cyclone (hurricane) category (1 – least intense; 5 – most intense) 
arising from increases in maximum wind speeds of 1, 3 and 5 m/s. Note the disproportionately large 
increase in the most intense tropical cyclones with modest increases in maximum wind speed, compared 
to the increase in less intense cyclones23.
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adaptation. Nevertheless, adaptation measures to lessen the impacts 
of climate change are urgently needed now. Given the considerable 
uncertainties around projections of climate impacts on water resources 
at local and regional scales, building resilience, managing risks, and 
employing adaptive management are likely to be the most effective 
adaptation strategies16 (session 29). Even with effective adaptation, 
the impacts on water resources in many parts of the world will be 
severe with climate change associated with only 1.0 to 1.5oC rises in 
temperature23.
Water resources are a growing problem for urban areas also. Lack of 
clean water in many of the new mega-cities, where ten million or more, 
often poor, inhabitants live, is already an issue of serious concern. In 
many cases, pressure on water supplies is exacerbated by changes in 
rainfall patterns and water availability resulting from climate change. A 
continuing flux of people into these new mega-cities, some of whom 
are escaping drying areas in the surrounding regions, adds further to 
the water stress.
Many of the most damaging effects of climate change are associated 
with extreme events – high intensity, relatively rare events such as 
cyclones and storms – rather than slow increases in average values 
Effects of Climate Change on Human Health and Well-Being
Prof. Anthony McMichael, Tony.McMichael@anu.edu.au & Dr. Roberto Bertollini, Bertollinir@who.int
BOX 3
The serious, increasingly evident, risks to human health from climate 
change underscore the potentially profound impact on Earth’s 
‘life-supports’. This ‘vital sign’ should help motivate government 
action. Low-income and geographically vulnerable populations are 
at greatest risk. These populations contributed little to the problem, 
yet incur much of the health risk.
The risks arise from direct stresses (e.g. heat-waves, weather 
disasters, workplace dehydration), from ecological disturbance (e.g. 
altered infectious disease patterns), and disruptions of ecosystems 
on which humanity depends (e.g. health consequences of reduced 
food yields), from population displacement and conflict over 
depleted resources (water, fertile land, fisheries). Melting ice-sheets 
may mobilise ice-bound chemical pollutants into the marine food 
web. 
Many specific impacts can be anticipated or, in some cases, 
observed now. Modelling studies indicate that a 2oC rise could 
cause 5-20% reductions of cereal grain yields in South Asia, South 
East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, significantly exacerbating under-
nutrition and adverse health outcomes (especially child physical 
and intellectual development). In many urban populations, a 2oC 
rise would increase the annual death rate from heat-waves by an 
estimated doubling or more. A 2oC rise would allow a 50-100% 
increase in the geographic range of potential transmission of (water 
snail-hosted) schistosomiasis in China, endangering many tens of 
millions of people. Recent experience from coastal Alaska shows 
that a 1oC rise in water temperature has, by passing a threshold, 
enabled summer-long bacterial proliferation in shellfish and 
consequent gastroenteritis in consumers.
Health-protecting adaptive strategies are already needed, both for 
current and anticipated future risks. The World Health Organization 
is supporting member states in their activities, leading to formal 
standardised country-level health risk assessment and adaptive 
strategy planning in relation to climate change. Meanwhile, positive health-promoting benefits can flow from 
many mitigation activities, via enhanced air quality, physical activity patterns, and dietary balance16 (session 14). 
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Water Resources and Climate Change: Building Resilience Towards a Sustainable Future
Prof. Maria Carmen Lemos, lemos@umich.edu and Prof. Torkil Jønch Clausen, tjc@dhigroup.com 
BOX 4
Climate change often affects human societies through the water system, directly and 
indirectly, by a combination of changes in water availability, accelerating floods and 
droughts, and sea level rise and storms. These impacts are already occurring, affecting 
the poorest and disadvantaged people and countries the most. Many of these impacts 
will accelerate irrespective of future agreements and actions to reduce emissions. 
Enough is known now to start building adaptive capacity among vulnerable populations 
and ecosystems. However, improvement is required in our knowledge and modelling 
capabilities of the physical, social and environmental processes that affect the resilience 
of water systems to ensure sustainable solutions for tomorrow. Good governance is 
key to successful adaptation, building on integrated and adaptive approaches from the 
community level to trans-boundary river basins. The need for open and transparent sharing 
of data, information and knowledge among all stakeholders is crucial16 (session 29).
Photo: John McConnico
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of climatic parameters. Furthermore, extreme events may respond to 
climate change by becoming even “more extreme”. For example, even 
with a modest increase in surface wind speed of 5 metres per second in 
tropical cyclones, possible with just a 1oC rise in ocean temperature, the 
number of the most intense and destructive cyclones (Category 5) may 
double while the incidence of less intense cyclones would experience 
much smaller increases (Figure 6). Observations from the last decade 
in the North Atlantic, in which the number of Category 5 cyclones has 
increased by 300-400%, support this analysis24. The consequences of 
these events for coastal communities around the world, from small 
fishing villages on Pacific atolls to mega-cities on Chinese river deltas, 
are potentially severe, particularly when coupled with sea-level rise and 
a range of local factors that increase vulnerability. 
The increasing accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere is important for 
marine ecosystems as it increases ocean acidity (Box 5). While the precise 
effects of ocean acidification are not yet clear, those organisms which 
produce calcium carbonate are expected to be especially vulnerable. 
Animals such as corals may be particularly threatened – possibly even to 
extinction – within the next century if atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
continue to rise unchecked. The geologic record indicates that ecosystem 
recovery from such a change in ocean acidity would likely take hundreds 
of thousands, if not many millions, of years, although true recovery is 
impossible because extinctions are irreversible10.
Climate change has consequences for biodiversity, more generally, and for 
the many services that humans derive from diverse and well-functioning 
ecosystems. There is a looming biodiversity catastrophe if global mean 
temperature rises above the 2oC guardrail, ocean acidification spreads 
and sea-level rise accelerates26. These climate-related stressors will 
interact with a wide range of existing stressors on biodiversity. The 
catastrophe will be expressed as the extinction of a significant fraction 
of biological species within the next 100 years, a substantially reduced 
range and higher risk of eventual extinction for other species, and the 
degradation of ecosystem services (Box 6). Limiting temperature rise to 
2oC or less and rapidly implementing strong and proactive adaptation 
in conservation policy and management can limit the magnitude of the 
crisis but not entirely eliminate it16 (session 31).  
Estimates of the impacts of climate change on critical sectors such as 
water resources and biodiversity, and on more integrative measures 
of well-being such as health, are common approaches to defining 
dangerous climate change. More recent research on tipping elements 
in the Earth System provides another measure of potentially dangerous 
consequences for humanity of unabated climate change27. Tipping 
elements occur when a small change in an important variable, such as 
temperature, causes a rapid and unexpectedly large change in a feature 
of the climate, altering its condition or pattern of behaviour. 
Figure 7 shows the location of a number of such tipping elements, any 
one of which, if triggered, would lead to societal disruption for very 
large numbers of people. Tipping elements shown could be triggered 
this century by human-made climate change, and would show a 
significant change at time scales ranging from a decade or less, as for 
Figure 7
Map of potential climatic “tipping elements” . Tipping elements are regional-scale features of the climate 
that could exhibit threshold-type behaviour in response to human-driven climate change – that is, a small 
amount of climate change at a critical point could trigger an abrupt and/or irreversible shift in the tipping 
element. The consequences of such shifts in the tipping element for societies and ecosystems are likely to 
be severe. Question marks indicate systems whose status as tipping elements is particularly uncertain27,30.
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The Acidification of Planet Earth
Dr. Carol Turley, CT@pml.ac.uk & Prof. Mary Scholes, Mary.Scholes@wits.ac.za
BOX 5
Acidification of Planet Earth’s terrestrial and oceanic biospheres is happening now and 
caused by two very different anthropogenic sources. 
Land acidification is caused by nitric and sulphuric acids and whilst its significance 
emerged during the 1970s, it is still an issue in the developed world and a growing 
issue in developing countries. Land acidification results in changes to species diversity, 
net primary productivity, an imbalance of inorganic nitrogen ions in the soil, and 
eutrophication of fresh water bodies. Feedbacks between the land and aquatic systems 
are not well understood or researched. 
Ocean acidification is a direct and certain consequence of CO2 emissions to the 
atmosphere; its consequences on the global ocean are only now emerging. The oceans 
have already taken up around 27-34% of the CO2 produced by humankind since the 
industrial revolution. Whilst this has limited the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, it 
has come at the price of a dramatic change to ocean chemistry. In particular, and of 
great concern, are the observed changes in ocean pH and carbonate and bicarbonate 
ion concentrations. 
Evidence indicates that ocean acidification is a serious threat to many organisms and 
may have implications for food webs and ecosystems and the multi-billion dollar services 
they provide. For instance, erosion is likely to outpace growth of tropical coral reefs at 
450-480 ppm CO2; there are already reports of a 19% decrease in growth of Great 
Barrier Reef corals. 
When atmospheric CO2 reaches 450 ppm, large areas of the polar oceans will likely 
have become corrosive to shells of key marine calcifiers, an effect that will be strongest 
in the Arctic. Already, loss of shell weight in planktonic Antarctic calcifiers has been 
observed. Decreasing pH could also make oceans noisier in the audible range with potential 
implications for marine life, as well as for scientific, commercial, and naval applications using 
ocean acoustics.
The rate of change in ocean chemistry is very high (see figure), faster than previous ocean 
acidification-driven extinctions in Earth’s history, from which it took hundreds of thousands 
of years for marine ecosystems to recover. Ocean acidification will continue to track future 
CO2 emissions to the atmosphere so urgent and substantial emission reductions are the only 
way of reducing the impact of ocean acidification.
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Biodiversity and Climate Change: Findings of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Prof. Harold Mooney, hmooney@stanford.edu & Dr. Anne Larigauderie, anne@diversitasinternational.org
BOX 6
Over the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively 
than in any comparable period of time in human history. This has resulted in a substantial 
and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on Earth. The distribution of species on 
Earth is becoming more homogenous, as a result of both the prevalence of disturbed 
ecosystems and the proliferation of exotic invasive species. At the same time, humans 
have increased the species extinction rate by as much as 1,000 times over background 
rates typical over the planet’s history, as a result of direct use and of indirect impacts of 
land use such as habitat loss and landscape fragmentation. For example, 10–30% of 
mammal, bird, and amphibian species are currently threatened with extinction. Overall, 
changes being made in ecosystems are increasing the likelihood of nonlinear changes 
with important consequences for human well-being. Beyond species introductions 
and losses, these include fisheries collapse, eutrophication and hypoxia in freshwater 
systems, disease emergence, and regional climate change.
 
The changes that have been made to ecosystems have contributed to substantial net gains 
in human well-being and economic development, but these gains have been achieved at 
growing costs in the form of the degradation of many ecosystem services. Specifically, 
increase in a number of production services (especially crops, livestock and aquaculture) 
has come at a great cost to some other products such as wood fuel and freshwater, and 
to critical regulation services including regional and local climate regulation, air quality 
regulation, natural hazard regulation, and many spiritual, cultural, and aesthetic values. 
The degradation of ecosystem services often causes significant harm to human well-
being and represents a loss of a natural asset or wealth of a country. Unless addressed, 
these impacts will also substantially diminish the benefits that future generations obtain 
from ecosystems.
The degradation of ecosystem services could grow significantly worse during the first half 
of this century. Among other causes, direct contributions of climate change include:
Potential future impacts on biodiversity: By the end of the century, climate change •	
and its impacts may be the dominant direct driver of biodiversity loss and changes 
in ecosystem services globally.
Net harmful impact on ecosystem services: The balance of scientific evidence •	
suggests that there will be a significant net harmful impact on ecosystem services 
worldwide if global mean surface temperature increases more than 2oC above 
pre-industrial levels.
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Arctic summer sea ice and the Asian monsoon, to several centuries or 
a millennium, as for the Greenland ice sheet. For two of the tipping 
elements – Arctic summer sea ice and the Greenland ice sheet – a rise 
in global average temperature of 1-2oC would possibly be enough 
to trigger them27 although another study28 indicates that a global 
average warming of 3.1oC would be the threshold for the Greenland 
ice sheet. The magnitude of warming required to trigger most of the 
other tipping elements, however, is not well known but even a small 
risk of triggering them would be considered dangerous24. It is not only 
temperature increases that may trigger tipping events. Recent studies 
suggest that ocean acidification (Box 5) may cause the creation of areas 
in the ocean with reduced levels of oxygen – “marine oxygen holes” - 
with devastating consequences for marine life29.
One of the most common human responses to severe environmental 
stress, such as deterioration in water resources or food supply, is to move 
to places where conditions are better. The abrupt change of a tipping 
element such as the Asian monsoon to a substantially drier state, or the 
eventual loss of water storage capacity in Himalayan glaciers, would 
lead to environmental stress of profound proportions by reducing water 
availability in the Indo-Gangetic plain. The possibility of large numbers of 
forced migrants as a result of severe climate impacts has raised concerns 
that climate change may soon become a major issue (Box 7).
The IPCC in 200121 synthesised the types of analyses described above 
using the best scientific evidence available at the time in terms of “reasons 
for concern”. The resulting visual representation of that synthesis, the 
so-called “burning embers diagram”, shows the increasing risk of 
various types of climate impacts with an increase in global average 
temperature. Using the same methodology, the reasons for concern 
have been updated based on the most recent research31.  
Several insights relevant to the definition of dangerous climate change 
are obvious from a comparison of the 2001 and 2009 diagrams (Figure 
8). First, risks of deleterious climate change impacts now appear at 
significantly lower levels of global average temperature rise in the 
more recent analysis. Second, a 2oC guardrail, which was thought in 
2001 to have avoided serious risks for all five reasons for concern, is 
now inadequate to avoid serious risks to many unique and threatened 
ecosystems and to avoid a large increase in the risks associated with 
extreme weather events. Third, the risks of large scale discontinuities, 
such as the tipping elements described above, were considered to 
be very low in 2001 for a 2oC increase but are now considered to be 
moderate for the same increase.
In summary, although a 2oC rise in temperature above pre-industrial 
remains the most commonly quoted guardrail for avoiding dangerous 
climate change, it nevertheless carries significant risks of deleterious 
impacts for society and the environment. 
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Figure 8
Diagram relating the potential impacts of climate change to the rise in global average temperature. Zero on the temperature scale corresponds approximately to 1990 average temperature, and the bottom of the 
temperature scale to pre-industrial average temperature. The level of risk or severity of potential impacts increases with the intensity of red colour. The 2oC guardrail is shown for reference.
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Security Implications of Climate Change
Prof. Ole Wæver, ow@ifs.ku.dk
BOX 7
Climate change can create strains that increase the frequency of violent conflicts 
between societies, typically where the main causes are ethnic or political tensions but 
where added burdens from climate change weaken societies’ ability to handle tensions. 
Changing conditions for settlement, agriculture, mining, transportation, diseases and 
disasters lead to local conflicts due to competition, and to international conflicts mainly 
through migration or power shifts.
Historically, the major human response to climatic changes beyond local adaptation 
capacity was migration. When human communities in the past occasionally weathered 
comparably large changes this way, the world was not yet carved up into tightly regulated 
territorial states, and climate changed much more slowly than now. Today, large scale 
migration is usually resisted by states and becomes a conflict issue between them39,40.
Some researchers emphasise that a correlation between climate change and conflict is 
not documented in quantitative data41; others point out that this would in any case be 
unlikely given both the nature of these data sets and the relatively recent materialisation 
of the impacts of accelerating climate change on societies42,43. Much research is currently 
aimed at producing data better focused on measuring these relationships, thereby also 
preparing international society for managing the resulting conflicts. Meanwhile, non-
public analyses abound. Intelligence services and militaries place climate change ever 
more centrally in their preparations for future conflicts44,45. If major powers become 
involved in conflicts, political cooperation on climate policy will become much more 
difficult.
If international climate policy comes to be seen as manifestly failing, unilateral attempts 
to deal with the emergency situation can lead to conflicts, for example, over geo-
engineering. Also climate change policy and the lack thereof can itself become the object 
of international conflict or justify dramatic measures, as in the famous characterisation 
by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni of climate change as “an act of aggression by 
the rich against the poor”. 
Generally, when issues are cast in security terms, leaders get increased latitude for 
dramatic measures. It is crucial that this ‘security driven empowerment’ in the case of 
climate change gets ‘channelled’ into strengthening of international institutions, and 
not unilateral emergency acts42,43,46.
Factoring security into the climate change equation runs the risk of escalating vicious 
circles. In the parts of the world where health and well-being are most negatively 
impacted by climate change, the likelihood of conflict will increase most, and these 
conflicts will further reduce living standards. More privileged parts of the world are likely 
to first feel the spill-over effects from these conflicts, such as refugees and diseases, 
and at higher temperature increases see their own security agenda re-organised around 
climate change.
Photo: John McConnico
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Rapid, sustained, and effective mitigation based on coordinated global and regional action is required to 
avoid “dangerous climate change” regardless of how it is defined. Weaker targets for 2020 increase the 
risk of serious impacts, including the crossing of tipping points, and make the task of meeting 2050 targets 
more difficult and costly. Setting a credible long-term price for carbon and the adoption of policies that 
promote energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies are central to effective mitigation.  
KEY mESSAGE 3
LONG-TERM STRATEGY: GLOBAL 
TARGETS AND TIMETABLES
The goal of constraining warming to an average global temperature 
increase of no more than 2°C above preindustrial levels plays a 
central role in current discussions about appropriate climate policies. 
As described in the previous section, a 2oC warming would, in itself, 
introduce considerable risk to human society and natural ecosystems. 
Nevertheless, the facts that global average temperature has already 
risen by about 0.7°C and that greenhouse gas emissions from human 
activities are still increasing (Box 2) render the achievement of a more 
ambitious goal very difficult. Due to inertia in the climate system alone, 
the 2007 IPCC Report2 argues that a global temperature increase of 
about 1.4°C above pre-industrial levels is inevitable. There is also inertia 
in human systems but this is harder to quantify and it is not known 
how quickly or dramatically society can or will reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
What level of emission reductions is needed to retain climate change 
on the right side of the 2°C guardrail? The IPCC1 estimated the level 
of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at which the 
global average temperature rise would be contained within various 
ranges (Table 1). The concentrations are given both as CO2 and CO2-
equivalents. CO2-equivalents include the combined warming effects 
of CO2 and the non-CO2 greenhouse gases (excluding water vapour) 
as well as the net cooling effect of aerosols in the atmosphere. CO2-
equivalents are expressed as the equivalent amount of CO2 required 
to give the same net warming as that created by these other gases 
and aerosols. Aerosols are small particles suspended in the atmosphere 
that reflect the sun’s incoming radiation and thus have a cooling effect. 
As air pollution regulations become more stringent and the amount of 
particles emitted to the atmosphere from human activities decreases, 
the cooling effect of aerosols in the atmosphere will also be reduced. 
According to the IPCC analysis, atmospheric CO2 concentration should 
not exceed 400 ppm CO2 if the global temperature rise is to be kept 
within 2.0 – 2.4°C. Today, the CO2 concentration is around 385 
ppm33, and is rising by 2 ppm per year. The 2007 concentration of all 
greenhouse gases, both CO2 and non-CO2 gases, was about 463 ppm 
CO2-equivalents. Adjusting this concentration for the cooling effects of 
aerosols yields a CO2-equivalent concentration of 396 ppm34. A recent 
study35 estimates that a concentration of 450 ppm CO2-equivalents 
(including the cooling effect of aerosols) would give a 50-50 chance of 
limiting the temperature rise to 2°C or less.
Thus, atmospheric CO2 concentrations are already at levels predicted to 
lead to global warming of between 2.0 and 2.4°C (Table 1). If society 
wants to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at this level, then global 
emissions should, theoretically, be reduced by 60-80% immediately, the 
actual amount being dependent upon the amount that will be taken 
up by oceans and land. Given that such a drastic immediate reduction 
is impossible, greenhouse gas concentrations will continue to rise over 
the next few decades. An overshoot of the atmospheric greenhouse 
gas concentrations needed to constrain global warming to 2oC is thus 
inevitable. To limit the extent of the overshoot, emissions should peak 
in the near future. Recent studies22,36,37 suggest that if peak greenhouse 
gas emissions are not reached until after 2020, the emission reduction 
rates required thereafter to retain a reasonable chance of remaining 
within the 2°C guardrail will have to exceed 5% per annum. This is 
a daunting challenge when compared to a long-term average annual 
increase of 2% in emissions (Box 2). The conclusion from both the 
IPCC and later analyses38 is simple – immediate and dramatic emission 
reductions of all greenhouse gases are needed if the 2oC guardrail is to 
be respected.
Short-term financial concerns, political and institutional constraints 
and lack of public awareness and concern are the greatest barriers 
to immediately initiating ambitious emission reduction. There is still 
disagreement in the economics community as to whether climate change 
is simply an externality like any other or is fundamentally different from 
anything humanity has ever faced38,39. There is also disagreement about 
how to appraise the costs of mitigation as compared to the future 
costs of inaction, and how to evaluate the risks of climate change. 
Nevertheless, a growing number of analyses indicate that the costs of 
both adapting to and mitigating climate change will increase if action 
is postponed16 (sessions 32 & 52), (Box 8). Generally, economic analysts 
agree that the uncertainty about the extent of future climate change is 
not a rational reason for delaying programs to curb emissions. Existing 
economic structures and interests, however, can often prevent effective 
climate policy action.
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Table 1
Characteristics of various emission trajectories to achieve stabilisation of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, in CO2 and CO2-eq. The 
equilibrium global average temperature increase above pre-industrial is given for each stabilisation target. Only the first scenario, shown in the 
first row, has a possibility to meet the 2oC guardrail. Note that current atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations are about 385 ppm CO2 and 
396 ppm CO-eq (including the cooling effect of aerosols). Modified from1 (table 5.1, p. 67).
The Costs of Delaying Action 
Prof. Lord Nicholas Stern, n.stern@lse.ac.uk
BOX 8
Photo: John McConnico
Postponing emission reductions is potentially very costly. It implies:
More emissions now leading to greater and more rapid temperature increases •	
and, therefore, greater impacts and adaptation costs.
Locking in high-carbon infrastructure and delaying ‘clean’ technological •	
development.
More drastic cuts in emissions are required later on.•	
Greater near-term emissions lock us into greater climate change requiring greater costs
from climate impacts and more investment in adaptation. Furthermore, they lead to a 
faster rate of climate change with greater challenges for adaptation. There is a greater 
risk of crossing tipping points and, if dictated by emerging evidence, problems in 
changing to more ambitious targets.
Different emission trajectories will have different impact and adaptation implications but 
also different mitigation costs. Drastic emissions reductions would mean prematurely 
retiring productive capital stock (physical investments like cars and power stations) and 
is potentially very costly. They raise costs of new investments either through early use of 
developing technologies or earlier retirement of existing investments* using older 
technologies particularly in capital intensive sectors with durable investments, such as power 
generation, where plants are often expected to last 40-50 years.
While deploying technologies before they have matured incurs higher costs, these technologies 
will not mature without investment and clear policy signals. Developing new technologies 
lowers costs for future emissions reductions. Relying on greater emission reduction in the 
future depends on innovation delivering cost effective low-carbon approaches in sectors that 
would currently be expensive to decarbonise like aviation and agriculture. For a given level 
of emissions, the longer the delay in action on relatively low-cost emissions such as energy 
efficiency and deforestation, the greater the reductions that will be required in these high 
cost sectors. While there are risks on both sides, the available evidence suggests that it is the 
cost of doing too little that dominates most current proposals39.
*The words “using older technologies” have been removed at the request of the author
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Although it can be politically difficult, a critical step in curbing emissions 
is that businesses and consumers face an appropriate price for emitting 
greenhouse gases38,39. Emissions pricing can be done either through 
emissions targets and trading, through harmonised taxes and fees on 
emissions, or through a combination of these approaches. In any case, 
other policies and programmes to address additional externalities and 
market failures will likely be required (Box 9). If ambitious mitigation goals 
are to be achieved, then emissions reductions programmes and carbon 
pricing should be implemented as quickly as possible, and within stable 
policy frameworks. This will provide signals to investors, consumers, and 
innovators about the future market environment and thus encourage 
investments and ultimately reduce the cost of attaining a given 
mitigation goal. In concert with carbon pricing, adoption of policies and 
regulations that promote energy efficiency - for example, establishment 
of energy standards for appliances, housing and transport32,48,49 - and 
the widespread uptake of low-carbon technologies are also critical for 
rapid and effective mitigation50.
Without global cooperation, ambitious climate protection will be 
virtually impossible. To achieve ambitious mitigation goals, it is critical 
to move as quickly as possible to achieve widespread participation of all 
major countries in comprehensive mitigation action16,51,52,53 (sessions 
32 & 52). However, the current global economic crisis suggests that it 
would not be wise to build an intricate, highly connected global system 
in which collapse of a single element in the system leads to collapse 
of the whole16 (session 23). Nevertheless, a global action plan, global 
commitments and a global framework are necessary prerequisites to 
build an appropriate level of coordination of measures at all scales 
including the local, national and regional16 (session 58).
In addition to the economic and political constraints on reducing 
greenhouse gas concentrations, technical bottlenecks are also important. 
Stabilising atmospheric concentrations at any level will require emissions 
to be reduced to near-zero levels in the long term54. Some of the 
projected pathways that give a reasonable chance of staying within the 
2°C guardrail (Figure 9) suggest that global society may need to develop 
the capacity to remove carbon from the atmosphere55. Although some 
promising technologies - for example, Carbon Capture and Storage, 
CCS – are under development56, they are still some way from being 
deployed commercially and on a large-scale16 (session 17). 
Given the enormity of the mitigation challenge, increasing attention 
is being given to aggressive mitigation portfolios and their practical 
implementation. Analyses range from the potential of energy efficiency 
measures16 (session 20) and technical innovation in renewable energy 
systems57 to integrated assessments of the technical feasibility and 
economic affordability of emission pathways to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations at 400, 450 and 550 ppm CO2-equivalents, respectively 
(Figure 9). The 400 ppm CO2-equivalents target, about the same as 
today’s concentrations, is estimated to give a 75% chance of confining 
global warming to less than 2°C22,35. Energy-environment-economy 
modelling suggests that such a low-carbon pathway is feasible at 
moderate costs if the full suite of technologies is developed and 
employed, including large-scale biomass use and options to capture and 
store CO216 (session 27),60.
Others argue that the mitigation challenge might be much greater 
than currently envisaged, and that the innovation strategies required 
might hit technical, social, and ecological barriers. This line of argument 
points towards geo-engineering, in which humanity deliberately 
manipulates global-scale climate processes to achieve planetary cooling, 
as being a potential option in addition to mitigation strategies61. Social 
acceptance of geo-engineering approaches, however, has yet to be 
demonstrated62.
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Figure 9
Energy-related emission trajectories from 2000 to 2100 to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere at three different targets (coloured lines). The black line is a reference trajectory based on no 
climate policy. Estimated (median) probabilities of limiting global warming to maximally 2°C are indicated 
for the three stabilisation targets 35,58,63.   
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Economic Tools to Meet the Mitigation Challenge
Dr. Frank Jotzo, frank.jotzo@anu.edu.au 
BOX 9
Emissions pricing is the main economic tool for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
The two main pricing instruments are a carbon tax (setting the price), and emissions 
trading (setting the quantity, ‘cap and trade’), with hybrid schemes also possible. Most 
schemes planned and in place use emissions trading, sometimes with elements of price 
control. Taxes and trading perform differently under uncertainty, and debates continue 
among economists over which approach is preferable, but the fundamental principle is 
the same: a financial penalty is placed on emitting greenhouse gases and transmitted 
through markets, creating an incentive to cut emissions. Businesses and consumers 
shift to lower-emissions processes or products because it saves them money. The overall 
response is cost effective because the lowest cost options are used first.
 
Subsidies for low-carbon technologies are another critical tool to address externalities and 
market failures that may persist under emissions pricing. Examples include knowledge 
spillovers in research and development (R&D), credit constraints for investment, and 
misaligned incentives for end users. In many countries, fiscal stimulus packages to counter 
the recessionary effects of the Global Financial Crisis include public investment in low-carbon 
technology and infrastructure. Sector-specific regulatory approaches are also part of the 
climate economic toolbox, for example mandating that utilities buy a minimum share of 
electricity supplied by renewable energy sources. Such regulation can also include market 
mechanisms, like trading of renewable quotas between utilities. 
The central considerations in choosing and designing economic policies for greenhouse 
gas mitigation are their cost effectiveness and political sustainability. The key is to create 
stable price signals and long-term expectations of rising carbon prices, in order to support 
long-lived investments in mitigation measures; and to implement the policies widely across 
sectors and countries to maximise the incentives for reducing emissions and minimise the 
aggregated economic costs.
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Climate change is having, and will have, strongly differential effects on people within and between countries 
and regions, on this generation and future generations, and on human societies and the natural world. An 
effective, well-funded adaptation safety net is required for those people least capable of coping with climate 
change impacts, and equitable mitigation strategies are needed to protect the poor and most vulnerable. 
Tackling climate change should be seen as integral to the broader goals of enhancing socioeconomic 
development and equity throughout the world.
KEY mESSAGE 4
EQUITY DIMENSIONS
Equity considerations are prominent in the origins and consequences 
of climate change, and especially important in developing solutions to 
climate change. The climate is not changing uniformly around the world. 
Temperature is rising faster near the poles than at the equator, rainfall is 
changing in complex ways in which some regions are becoming wetter 
while others are drying, and extreme events are becoming more frequent 
in some locations compared to others. Inequities are also prominent 
in the human dimensions of climate change. In general, developed 
countries are most responsible for climate change up to now while 
developing countries suffer the majority of the impacts. For example, 
the impacts of climate change on health are profoundly unequal; the 
poor, the marginal, the uneducated and the geographically vulnerable 
are at greatest risk of injury and death16 (session 14). In general, the 
poor have the least capacity to adapt to climate change. Any lasting 
and widely accepted solution to the climate change challenge should 
recognise and account for these equity dimensions in negotiations and 
agreements.
Vulnerability to the impacts of climate change varies widely around 
the world, with ethics and justice issues emerging as key factors in 
adaptation approaches. Discussions of the inequalities surrounding 
adaptation commonly involve the interaction of adaptation with national 
poverty, regional imbalances in adaptive capacity, adaptation in the 
context of colonial histories, responsibility for financing adaptation and 
the ethics of imposing the adaptation burden on an already unequal 
world16 (sessions 10 & 11). A number of models have been proposed for 
addressing these equity issues, often oriented around the concept of a 
well-funded adaptation safety net for the most vulnerable (Box 10). 
Global analyses of hot spots for water scarcity and vulnerability of 
agriculture and food systems can identify the people and places most 
vulnerable to food shortages (Figure 10), helping to direct resources 
and expertise towards reducing these vulnerabilities. To date, there has 
been surprisingly little research specifically on maintaining or enhancing 
the productivity of food systems under a changing climate or on 
the vulnerability to climate change of other aspects of food systems 
such as distribution networks and food quality. This lack of research 
focus is a common problem in many developing regions of the world, 
where pressures for survival in the near term dominate over long term 
adaptation to climate change. Nevertheless, as climate change impacts 
increase in importance, additional resources will be required for both 
research and action to reduce the vulnerability of the most food-poor 
parts of the world64,65.
 
Equity issues have temporal as well as spatial dimensions. There has 
been much discussion about the obligations of the current generation 
to future generations and, although there is vigorous debate on 
many aspects of intergenerational equity, some areas of agreement 
have emerged. First, standard economic approaches employing cost-
benefit analysis and standard discounting fail to reflect the diversity 
of perspectives on obligations to future generations. Second, many 
different philosophical perspectives lead to the same conclusion – 
maintaining a business-as-usual approach to climate change is unjust to 
future generations, who have a fundamental right to an environment 
they can live in. In summary, the current generation is managing Earth’s 
natural capital so that a substantial environmental debt will be passed 
on for the next generations to repay16 (session 12).
 
The unfolding biodiversity catastrophe raises not only concerns about 
the provision of ecosystem services to humans26, but also ethical issues 
regarding the relationship between humanity and the rest of nature. 
While contemporary society often views the natural world as a vast 
array of resources for exploitation, the recreational and spiritual values 
of nature remain important for many people. Thus, the potential 
extinction of charismatic species, such as Emperor Penguins, or iconic 
ecosystems, such as coral reefs or rainforests, as a consequence of 
climate change is regarded as unacceptable by many people. Biocentric 
and ecocentric ethical perspectives confer moral status on plants, 
animals and ecosystems, and thus climate change-driven extinctions are 
viewed as matter of injustice when equity between humanity and the 
rest of nature is considered16 (session 13).
Equity issues are also prominent in mitigation of climate change, and 
invariably enter discussions of differential responsibilities for emission 
reductions across countries. The scientific basis for the equity dilemma 
regarding mitigation is the so-called stocks and flows problem18. The 
climate responds to the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
– the stocks. Because of the long lifetime of CO2 and some other 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the stocks are dominated by 
the historical emissions from developed countries. Thus, the level of 
climate change being experienced in 2009 is largely caused by the 
historical emissions from wealthy countries (Figure 11). However, the 
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Figure 10
Projected climate change impacts on agricultural production in 2030, expressed as a percentage change 
relative to 1998-2002 average yields. Pink, green and blue indicate a “hunger importance ranking” of 1 
to 30 (more important), 31 to 60, and 61-94 (less important), respectively. Dashed lines extend from 5th 
to 95th percentile of projections, boxes extend from 25th to 75th percentile, and the middle vertical line 
within each box indicates the median projection. Region codes are: CHI – China; SAS – South Asia; SEA – 
Southeast Asia; WAS – West Asia; WAF – West Africa; SAH Sahel; CAF – Central Africa; EAF – East Africa; 
SAF – Southern Africa; BRA – Brazil; AND – Andean Region; CAC – Central America and Caribbean64.
Funding for Adaptation
Prof. J. Timmons Roberts, jtrobe@wm.edu and Prof. Coleen Vogel, Coleen.Vogel@wits.ac.za
BOX 10
The world’s poorest are usually the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 
but least responsible for them. The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have both stated that 
substantial funding should flow from those with the “capability” to cope with and 
manage climate change to those without. Agreeing to that principle was the easy part; 
a global pact, however, must address a series of crucial questions. How much funding is 
needed for adaptation and how do we know and estimate these costs, both for the near 
and longer term? Who should pay for adaptation and how much should each country 
pay? How can adequate payments be reliably and justly raised? How can international 
funds for adaptation be fairly distributed and effectively put to use?
 
Estimates of the amount of funds required for developing nations to adapt to the likely 
impacts of climate change currently range from eight to over one hundred billion dollars 
a year, but it is clear that tens of billions of dollars may be needed to be mobilised 
annually, starting now. Current voluntary funds are grossly inadequate. As in most 
disasters, despite significant efforts, many of the impacts and disaster losses are never 
repaired or repaid. The Polluter Pays Principle, however, suggests that those who created 
the need to adapt should pay for it. It is crucial that these payments be considered 
obligatory restitution for damages done, and not treated as optional or charity.
The UNFCCC specifies that action on climate change should be based on responsibility 
and capability. The most promising approaches utilise revenues generated in wealthier 
nations in driving their emissions reductions (by carbon taxes or permit auctioning 
revenues) to address the needs of poorer nations to adapt. International levies on 
carbon trading or transportation have advantages over funding raised through national 
taxes, which risk being captured by national politicians under pressure to address other local 
priorities. Finally, careful attention must be paid to fair and effective distribution of adaptation 
funds: participatory processes, transparency of delivery, and independent evaluation of their 
use will all be needed to maintain broad confidence. 
Photo: John McConnico
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origins of human emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere 
are changing rapidly. The rate of increase in emissions is now dominated 
by developing countries, and the large Asian economies, in particular, 
have become signifi cant emitters of CO2 into the atmosphere in terms 
of annual fl ows. However, on a per capita basis, developed countries 
still dominate emissions and will continue to do so in the foreseeable 
future.
In a 2050 world of 9 billion people, to meet the emission reduction 
targets to avoid dangerous climate change (Key Message 2), per 
capita emissions will need to be about 2 tonnes of carbon dioxide per 
annum or less. As noted, per capita emissions at present vary widely 
from country to country – for example, in the USA, they are over 20 
tonnes, in the Nordic countries about 11 tonnes, and in China, under 
4 tonnes66. To convert the required per capita average into a binding 
emissions entitlement per person across the world is a complex issue, 
involving issues of historical responsibility (Figure 11) as well as the time 
required to eliminate the current differences between countries. 
Mitigation approaches in a national context are also beset with equity 
challenges. They invariably intersect with structural inequalities in 
complex ways, often to disadvantage economically and politically 
weaker sub-populations. Energy policies to limit emissions should be 
sensitive to specifi c patterns of energy consumption that vary across 
households and individuals in terms of income, urban vs. rural locations, 
gender and age. Dealing with these challenges requires the increased 
participation of and consideration of all social groups in policy design 
and implementation16 (session 10).
Development, deployment and diffusion of low- or no-carbon 
technologies are critical aspects of the mitigation efforts that also 
intersect strongly with equity issues, especially for developed-developing 
country interaction. The introduction of a mix of different non-fossil 
complex and contentious. Changes in forest land cover are responsible 
for about 15% of human global greenhouse gas emissions1. Approaches 
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
are gaining support as a potentially effective and effi cient mitigation 
strategy (Key Message 5), but challenges remain to ensure that such 
strategies are equitable, especially the need to protect the rights and 
livelihoods of forest-dependent populations. To achieve widespread 
acceptance, such projects should avoid the mistakes and build on the 
successes of previous attempts to control deforestation, which implies 
fuel energy sources to reduce emissions is sometimes argued to slow 
poverty alleviation in the developing world due to its high requirement 
for investment16 (session 21) although it can have the opposite effect 
when appropriately designed and implemented. Some key principles 
when introducing non-fossil fuel energy sources are: (i) explicitly plan 
for spill-over and diffusion to developing countries when demonstration 
projects are carried out in a developed country; (ii) design co-benefi ts 
for other aspects of socio-economic development and include explicit 
incentives to support low-carbon energy systems; and (iii) technologies 
do not have to be the most advanced and costly to be effective in the 
developing world16 (sessions 21 & 27). An example of the last principle 
is the rapid diffusion of low cost, low maintenance solar cell technology 
in Kenya57 (Figure 12). 
Using biological systems to store carbon and reduce emissions is a 
potential mitigation approach for which equity considerations are 
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Figure 11
Various aspects of human carbon emissions by country/region, highlighting the so-called stocks and fl ows 
problem. The fi rst column shows the cumulative emissions from the beginning of the industrial revolution 
to 2004. It is these stocks of carbon in the atmosphere that are largely driving observed climate change. 
The second column shows the fl ow rate of human carbon emissions into the atmosphere in 2004. The 
third column shows the annual rate in 2004 by which the fl ows of carbon into the atmosphere are 
growing18. FSU is the Former Soviet Union.
Figure 12
Small-scale photo-voltaic cells (average system – 18 watts) as used in Kenya. The rate of uptake of this 
technology is higher in Kenya than in any other country in the world57.
Photo: Arne Jacobson
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that policy tools need to address the true drivers of deforestation. These 
are often cross-sectoral and outside of the traditional forestry sector. 
Furthermore, forest protection approaches need to accommodate 
diverse local situations, both in political economy and in ecology16 
(session 25). 
Other biology-based mitigation approaches include the development 
and use of biofuels. These, however, also involve equity considerations. 
The 2008 spike in food prices, which was at least in part attributable to 
competition with biofuels for land, has highlighted the potential conflict 
driven by the demand of wealthy countries for liquid fuels and the need 
of the poor in developing countries for food security. Second-generation 
biofuel systems are designed to remove this potential conflict by using 
non-food feedstocks and by using land unsuitable for food production16 
(session 18). 
Equity issues pervade virtually all aspects of the climate change 
challenge. Attempts to separate or compartmentalise emission reduction 
and adaptation activities from the broader goals of socio-economic 
development in many parts of the world are doomed to failure. The twin 
challenges of the 21st century – avoiding dangerous climate change and 
poverty alleviation – should and can be tackled together67,68.
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Society already has many tools and approaches – economic, technological, behavioural, and managerial 
– to deal effectively with the climate change challenge. If these tools are not vigorously and widely 
implemented, adaptation to the unavoidable climate change and the societal transformation required to 
decarbonise economies will not be achieved. A wide range of benefits will flow from a concerted effort to 
achieve effective and rapid adaptation and mitigation. These include job growth in the sustainable energy 
sector; reductions in the health, social, economic and environmental costs of climate change; and the repair 
of ecosystems and revitalisation of ecosystem services.
KEY mESSAGE 5
INACTION IS INExCUSABLE
Any societal response to human caused climate change should be a 
combination of mitigation, whereby active measures are taken to 
reduce or change the human activities that are driving climate change, 
and adaptation, whereby society increases its capacity to cope with the 
impacts of climate change, so far as possible. Mitigation and adaptation 
are closely related as response strategies. Adaptation is essential, as 
even a massive mitigation effort initiated today would be unable to 
eliminate the impacts of the climate change that are already occurring 
and those to which society is committed in the future owing to the 
inertia in the climate. At the other extreme, if no mitigation is initiated 
and human caused climate change is allowed to continue unabated, 
the risk of the most dangerous or catastrophic impacts associated with 
a global warming of several degrees is large (Key Message 2). Even 
the wealthiest of societies, with the best and most well-resourced 
adaptation activities, would probably not be able to completely adapt 
to such levels of climate change. This simple reality underscores the fact 
that effective climate policies should combine both adaptation measures 
and mitigation activities.
A reduction of human emissions of greenhouse gases to the level 
necessary to stay within the 2°C guardrail cannot happen unless a very 
much larger percentage of societal energy demands is met by non-fossil 
fuel sources. Developing an economy less dependent on fossil fuels is 
referred to as “decarbonising the economy”. Many renewable energy 
technologies that can contribute to decarbonising the global economy 
have been under development in recent years (Box 11). Although there is 
no “silver bullet” – no single renewable technology that can replace fossil 
fuels in their totality – a mix of technologies can allow different countries 
and regions to develop their own renewable energy combinations 
to meet their own needs. Technologies are already available that, in 
combination with changes on the demand side - reduced energy usage 
and improved energy efficiency – give the potential to achieve a 50% 
greenhouse gas emission reduction by 2050 and, in some regions, to 
reduce emissions to virtually zero by that time16 (session 19). Reaching 
such goals, however, requires rapid, substantial build-up of production 
capacity through concerted investments; a stable policy framework; 
and research, development and demonstration to facilitate technology 
learning and reduce production costs (Figure 13). 
“Smart grids”, where different elements of the energy system, including 
production, flexible demand, storage and energy conversion, interact 
to provide a stable and efficient energy system, will be essential to 
integrate large fractions of renewable energy. The development of 
“super-grids” - regional energy supply systems providing energy over 
large geographical areas - may also be necessary to facilitate integration 
of wind, solar and other renewable energy technologies together 
with large-scale energy storage facilities, such as hydroelectric power 
facilities. Such grids can help to balance loads and moderate fluctuations 
in production16 (session 19). 
In some cases, renewable technologies may actually be more immediately 
applicable to developing country requirements than more traditional 
fossil fuel based energy systems because they can work in remote areas 
on smaller scales and may need less maintenance and local technical 
capacity (Key Message 4). Some technologies, such as early solar 
technologies, that may not be appropriate for power generation in 
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Figure 13
The drop in module price of thin-film photo-voltaic (PV) solar cells as the cumulative production increases, 
a reinforcing feedback loop which shows that early, significant investment in renewable technologies will 
increase their rate of uptake, further lowering unit costs69. The solid line shows historical data and the 
broken line shows the projected trajectory based on a continuation of historical trends.
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countries that already have a modern and reliable energy distribution 
system, may nevertheless be well suited for power generation in 
developing communities that do not have access to reliable electricity 
systems. In other words, when climate considerations are integrated 
into development activities, the goals of climate change mitigation and 
development can be strongly synergistic. 
In addition to the development of renewable energy technologies, the 
management of biological systems has considerable potential as a tool 
for mitigation. Forests, for example, can remove significant amounts of 
CO2 from the atmosphere, as trees (like all plants) capture CO2 through 
photosynthesis and convert it to biomass. Because plant communities 
consisting of many species generally take up more carbon from the 
atmosphere than communities consisting of just one or a few species70, 
the preservation of biodiverse natural forests has come into sharp 
focus as a mitigation tool through the REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation) initiative16 (session 25), (Figure 
14). Its aim is to significantly reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases 
associated with the conversion of natural forests to other land uses. 
While REDD has much appeal, it also presents enormous challenges: 
how can baselines be established from which increases or decreases 
in deforestation can be measured? What are the conditions and 
mechanisms - financial and other - that best support REDD? How can 
local populations be fairly compensated for dedicating “their” land and 
its carbon values for a global purpose (Key Message 4)? Furthermore, 
if temperature increases by 2°C or more, there is a risk that land 
ecosystems, including forests, may become a net source of carbon to 
the atmosphere due to increases in respiration and in disturbances such 
as fire. The loss of carbon-regulating services of forests would seriously 
accelerate climate change16 (session 38), (Box 2).
Agriculture is the most widespread and fundamentally important of all 
human land uses but it is also a significant emitter of greenhouse gases 
to the atmosphere. On the other hand, very significant and cost effective 
greenhouse gas reductions can be made in modern agriculture, primarily 
through altered management practices. Enhanced soil carbon storage 
has, in particular, large emission reduction potential in the short-term, 
while offering long-term increases in sustainability of farming systems. 
This mitigation potential, however, is unlikely to be achieved unless a 
realistic price is put on greenhouse gas emissions. There are also other 
barriers - structural, institutional, financial and educational - to altering 
agricultural management practices to become more climate friendly16 
(session 24), (Figure 15).
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Figure 14
Modelled emissions from deforestation under seven REDD design options, by region. The different design 
options are based on varying approaches for defining the baseline from which additional deforestation 
would be measured, the nature of financial mechanisms, measures to control internal “leakage” of 
deforestation to countries with historically low deforestation rates, and other factors16 (session 25). The 
results of the analysis show that regardless of the details of the particular design, the REDD approach can 
reduce emissions from deforestation to less than half. The results vary strongly by region, with Asia and 
Latin America showing very large emission reductions via REDD, while the gains are very small in Africa. 
Thus, the results are far more sensitive to regional differences than they are to the nature of the REDD 
design71.
Figure 15
Impacts of different constraints on reducing greenhouse gas mitigation potential from its theoretical 
biophysical maximum to the lower achievable potential72. Ecological constraints, such as nutrient or water 
limitations, can significantly reduce the theoretical biological potential for carbon uptake in production 
systems. Economic, social and political considerations can provide further constraints, which results in a 
realised level of carbon uptake that is far less than the theoretical maximum.
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Technology Feedstocks Process  
technology
Potential  
competition  
with food  
production
Conversion  
efficiency
Level of feed 
by-products 
1st generation 
bioethanol
Cereals, sugar cane, 
tubers
Fermentation Low to high 30-65% High
2nd generation 
bioethanol
Residues, waste, 
bioenergy crops
Fermentation Low 30-75% Low to high
Biogas (meth-
ane)
Manure, energy 
crops, organic waste
Mesophilic  
fermentation
Low to high 60-80% None
Biodiesel Oil crops, food & 
animal waste
Extraction & 
transesterification
Low to high 85% Low to high
Biomass to Liq-
uid (diesel)
Any biomass,  
preferably wood
Thermochemical Low 50-60% None
Biomass for 
heat and power
Any biomass,  
preferably waste and 
residues
Thermochemical Low 50-65% None
3rd generation 
biofuels
Algae, halophytes, 
waste and residues
Thermochemi-
cal, biological, 
extraction
None < 65% Unknown
Table 2
Comparison of biomass to energy conversion technologies. Note the large variation in conversion 
efficiencies. This reflects the difference between earlier technologies and the current state of the art. The 
conversion efficiency for biomass for heat and power is based on the average annual efficiency73-84. 
Figure 16
A visual representation of active adaptive management, an iterative approach built around explicit, 
experimentally based development of plausible management options72,86.
Perhaps the most controversial of all biology-based mitigation tools are 
biofuels, which are produced from plant biomass and can be combusted 
to generate heat and power so that they can substitute for fossil fuels 
(Table 2). Ultimately, a transport sector less dependent on fossil-derived 
liquid fuels is necessary. In the short term, biofuels are important to 
reduce the use of fossil fuels for cars; in a longer timeframe they will 
likely replace fossil fuels for airplanes and ships16 (session 18). The 
limiting factor is the amount of land that can be devoted to 
the production of biofuels. Therefore, much effort 
is currently being devoted to the development 
of 2nd generation biofuel systems that are 
based on “waste” plant material rather 
than on crops cultivated for the sole 
purpose of energy production. 
Based on this reasoning, as 
well as on a comparison of 
the total energy required for 
production compared to the 
total energy yield, the use 
of the oil crops - oil palm, 
rape, sunflower and soy - is 
not sustainable and should 
therefore be avoided16 
(session 18).
With respect to adaptation, 
sectors that are already tightly 
managed by humans - food 
systems, forestry, and water 
systems - can most readily be 
adapted to the impacts of climate 
change16 (session 38). Agriculture 
and forestry can, for example, change 
to alternative crops or tree species that 
require less or tolerate more water, or that 
remain productive under higher temperatures. 
However, there are limits to such adaptations if the climate changes too 
much or too fast. In agriculture, mitigation and adaptation often involve 
the same management strategies and can thus be achieved at the same 
time, giving synergistic outcomes85. 
It is more difficult to develop adaptation strategies for natural systems, 
which provide the indirect ecosystem services that ultimately underpin 
human well-being. A new paradigm for nature conservation would be 
more appropriate in the face of climate change16 (sessions 31 & 38). This 
paradigm should concentrate primarily on enhancing the resilience of 
well functioning ecosystems. Appropriate adaptation strategies include 
the expansion and connection of protected area networks, the control 
of alien species, and the use of active adaptive management (Figure 16). 
Some presently used conservation tools, such as static red species lists, 
small unconnected protected areas and political borders as boundaries 
for declaring threatened species, are not effective adaptation tools with 
respect to climate change16 (session 31). 
Even with the most effective adaptation approaches, very large numbers 
of species will not survive with unabated climate change (Key Message 
2). To avoid a worsening extinction crisis, there is no alternative to rapid, 
effective mitigation. In addition, investment in ex situ conservation – 
that is, keeping organisms in captivity or maintaining seed banks - could 
be made in the hope that these organisms, one day, can be released 
back into the wild should a suitable climate be recovered86. At best, 
however, ex situ measures will be feasible for only a few species. 
For the developing world, in particular, perhaps the most important 
message emerging from current adaptation efforts is that climate 
considerations should be included in both domestic policies and 
foreign assistance. Adaptation to climate change cannot be successfully 
implemented if treated as an “add on” and implemented separately 
from other initiatives aimed at fostering economic and social 
development and increasing the resilience of societies. 
Although the full impact of future climate change is 
not yet known, some current trends are becoming 
apparent - changing access to fresh water, 
increased frequency of storms and floods, 
and drought-affected agricultural areas. 
Many ‘no regrets’ adaptations - for 
example, those that sustain water 
supplies or secure dwellings - can 
be implemented now and will 
build societal resilience towards 
further climate change66. 
As part of building effective 
adaptation, research is urgently 
required into the implications 
of existing policies and potential 
future policies with regard to 
adaptation: do they support 
or hinder adaptation, and how 
do they need to be changed? 
Investment for infrastructure also 
needs to be considered in a climate 
adaptation context: which projects have 
the best benefit-cost ratio and when should 
investment decisions be taken? Furthermore, 
because climate is tracking near the upper range of 
projections, societies require adaptation policies, practices 
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The Benefits of Decarbonising the Economy
Prof. Daniel Kammen, kammen@berkeley.edu 
BOX 11
One of the most important lessons of the rapidly-expanding mix of energy efficiency, 
solar, wind, biofuels, and other low-carbon technologies is that the costs of deployment 
are lower than many forecasts, and at the same time, the benefits are larger than 
expected. This seeming ‘win-win’ claim deserves examination, and continued verification, 
of course.  
Over the past decade, the solar and wind energy markets have been growing at rates 
over 30% per year, and in the last several years growth rates of over 50% per year have 
taken place in the solar energy sector91. This rapid and sustained growth has meant that 
costs have fallen steadily, and that an increasingly diverse set of innovative technologies 
and companies have been formed. Government policies in an increasing number of 
cities, states, and nations are finding creative and cost-effective ways to build these 
markets still further.
At the same time that a diverse set of low-carbon technologies are finding their way to 
the market, energy efficiency technologies (e.g. ‘smart’ windows, energy efficient lighting 
and heating/ventilation systems, weatherisation products, and efficient appliances) and 
practices are all in increasingly widespread deployment. Many of these energy efficiency 
innovations demonstrate negative costs over time, meaning that when the full range of 
benefits (including improved quality of energy services, improved health, and worker 
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productivity) are tabulated, some energy efficiency investments are vehicles for net creation 
of social benefits over time.  
The cost of carbon abatement curves have become famous since the Swedish power company 
Vattenfall collaborated with the McKinsey Company to develop a set of estimates on the 
costs to deploy and operate a range of energy efficiency, land use, and energy generation 
technologies. These costs of conserved carbon curves depict the costs (or savings, in the case 
of a number of ‘negative cost’ options such as building efficiency) as well as the magnitude 
(in giga-tonnes) of abatement potential at a projected future time. The most common plots 
are for 2030.
The figure shows the famous ‘Vattenfall, or McKinsey curves’, which provides one set of such 
cost/reward estimates that integrates both energy efficiency and clean energy generation 
technologies, in this case presented as a snapshot for the year 2030.  
Many more innovations are on the near-term horizon, including those that use innovative 
municipal financing to remove entirely the up-front costs of energy efficiency and renewable 
energy investments through loans that are repaid over the duration of the services provided 
by clean and efficient energy products92. 
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Climate Change and Urban Areas
Prof. Roberto Sanchez Rodriguez, roberto@ucr.edu
BOX 12
Climate change is more than an environmental problem; it is also a major development 
challenge for urban areas. Urban areas are highly vulnerable to crises and disasters associated 
with climate variability and climate change. Their cumulative impacts have severe economic 
and human costs; quickly lead to serious bottlenecks or emergencies in the supply of key 
resources such as water, energy and food; and affect the living conditions for a vast number 
of people.  The UN estimates that a total of 2.5 billion people were affected by disasters 
between 1995 and 2004, 75% of which were related to weather extremes. 
Reducing social and urban vulnerability and enhancing adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change offer extended social, economic, health, and environmental benefits for local 
and national governments. Important elements in adaptation strategies include poverty 
alleviation, improvement of livelihood strategies, building human capital, protection of 
environmental assets, enhancing public health, and creating opportunities for sustainable 
development. There is also an urgent need to incorporate adaptive criteria in the design 
and planning of the built environment - urban infrastructure, buildings, and transportation. 
The life span of infrastructure is often over 75 years and structures being built now will 
operate under different climatic conditions in the coming decades. Current investments 
seldom take into account the potential impacts of climate change that could cause 
significant dysfunctions in their operation. 
Incorporating multidimensional adaptive strategies into current urban development 
strategies will make an efficient use of scarce financial, technical, human, and natural 
resources, particularly in poor countries and emerging economies. A critical step in this 
direction is assisting policy makers, urban planners, and stakeholders to incorporate 
adaptation strategies and define alternative and sustainable paths of urban growth. 
There is a tremendous opportunity to integrate development, mitigation, and adaptation 
strategies to create more resilient urban areas. Further delays in developing and 
implementing adaptation strategies will have severe consequences for millions of urban 
inhabitants and ultimately local and national economies. 
and infrastructure that can cope with extreme events at the severe 
end of the probability distribution. Thus, adaptation strategies should 
include a strong component of disaster preparedness, placing even 
more emphasis on emergency management services16 (session 32). 
As effective and necessary as these mitigation and adaptation approaches 
are individually, the integration of adaptation and mitigation activities 
in a systems framework is now becoming paramount in order to 
capture synergies that enhance the effectiveness of each and to avoid 
perverse outcomes in which mitigation activities could have deleterious 
outcomes for adaptation and vice versa. Nowhere is the need for 
integrative, systems-level approaches more pressing than in land use. 
One of the greatest challenges facing human society as population 
continues to grow is prioritising land use to balance local needs, such 
as food production and space for dwellings and businesses, and global 
needs, such as the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere, production of 
biomass for energy and biofuels, and protection of biodiversity. 
Today, approximately 12% of the Earth’s land area is under intensive 
crop production88,89 and much more is pasture and rangeland used 
for livestock production. About 70% of the freshwater co-opted for 
human use is allocated to agriculture90. With the demand for food 
continuing to increase as population grows, coupled with an escalating 
demand for land-based mitigation activities as well as a growing need 
for “land for nature”, society is under pressure to equitably manage an 
unprecedented competition for land and water at all scales, from local 
to global. 
 
Much of the change to the Earth’s land surface is driven by the 
provision of ecosystem services for an increasingly urban population. 
Just over half of humans now live in cities, but urban areas account 
for approximately 75% of humanity’s greenhouse gas emissions, either 
directly or indirectly16 (session 33). Many cities are also particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, such as extreme weather 
events and rising sea-level. This has prompted the UN to declare that 
the battle against climate change will be won or lost in cities16 (session 
33), and makes an integrated approach to adaptation and mitigation in 
urban areas particularly important (Box 12).
In summary, society has many tools to facilitate both mitigation of 
climate change and adaptation to the impacts that cannot be avoided, 
but debates still surround the ways to further develop and apply these 
tools16 (sessions 40, 41 & 43). Society also has a number of economic 
approaches to promote the adoption of these tools and encourage the 
energy transition necessary to constrain global warming (Box 8). The 
critical missing ingredients to achieve the societal transition that climate 
change demands are the political will and the social acceptance of the 
need for change.
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If the societal transformation required to meet the climate change challenge is to be achieved, a number 
of significant constraints must be overcome and critical opportunities seized. These include reducing inertia 
in social and economic systems; building on a growing public desire for governments to act on climate 
change; reducing activities that increase greenhouse gas emissions and reduce resilience (e.g., subsidies); 
and enabling the shifts from ineffective governance and weak institutions to innovative leadership 
in government, the private sector and civil society. Linking climate change with broader sustainable 
consumption and production concerns, human rights issues and democratic values is crucial for shifting 
societies towards more sustainable development pathways.
KEY mESSAGE 6
MEETING THE CHALLENGE
The evidence presented earlier on the nature of dangerous climate 
change (Key Messages 1 and 2), the emission reduction pathways 
needed to avoid dangerous climate change (Key Message 3) and the 
need to meet this challenge in an equitable way (Key Message 4) together 
send a clear, strong message – “business-as-usual is dead”39. Marginal 
changes to the current socio-economic and technological trajectory 
of contemporary society will not be sufficient to facilitate the societal 
transition required to keep climate change within a 2°C guardrail. Many 
technological and managerial tools and policy approaches are available 
now to drive the required transformation (Key Message 5). The ultimate 
challenges are to trigger, facilitate and support the transition – removing 
the constraints and seizing the many opportunities that such a societal 
transformation offers. 
The research required to inform and support a major societal 
transformation lies primarily in the domains of the humanities and social 
sciences, which have been much less prominent in the climate change 
discourse than natural sciences and economics. Nevertheless, their 
insights into human cultures, behaviours and organisation are crucial to 
meeting the climate change challenge.
Transitioning contemporary society to a more sustainable future must 
occur at many scales – from individual to institutional and governmental 
– and at many levels – from changes in everyday behaviour to a re-
examination of core values, beliefs and worldviews (Box 13). Indeed, the 
language used to discuss human caused climate change often reflects 
underlying worldviews. For example, a focus in the political process on 
greenhouse gas “reductions” and “sharing the burden” reinforces the 
view that climate change mitigation is an evil that should be avoided as 
much as possible. On the other hand, a focus on the benefits derived 
from avoiding the serious impacts of unabated climate change or on the 
economic and employment opportunities provided by decarbonising 
the economy (Box 11) builds worldviews that are much more positive 
and optimistic.
Many worldviews emphasise the importance of governmental actions in 
dealing with climate change, yet much can be achieved by recognizing 
and encouraging a wide range of non-state actors that use “social-
practice” approaches to build on the voluntary actions of individuals 
and small groups16 (session 48). Behavioural change is at the centre 
of any transformation, and experience and social learning offer much 
hope for the future (Box 14). 
Individuals alone cannot solve the climate change problem, nor can 
national governments on their own. A wide range of other organizations 
– multinational corporations and other business groups, environmental 
NGOs, scientific research organizations and sub-national governmental 
bodies – are crucial to developing a societal response. The business 
community, in particular, is increasingly insistent on the need for policy 
frameworks that create a positive environment for investment and 
change. Some features of this environment are: (i) partnerships for 
action that build a common strategy even if underlying motivations 
Figure 17
Typical interactions in multi-level governance systems, in which citizens groups can play a key role 
in mediating between policymaking that operates at regional or national scales, and the on-ground 
management of biophysical systems, which often occurs at the local scale. Such professionally organised 
multi-level processes can help to reduce scale mismatches and policy incoherence, and to support 
integrated social and regulatory changes93.
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are not aligned; (ii) trust-building between business and civil society; 
and (iii) leadership that empowers people and supports learning and 
adaptive management16 (sessions 48 & 54).   
Civil society – communities and stakeholders – engages with climate 
policy in a multitude of ways (Figure 17). Central to many of the 
approaches are stakeholder consultations or engagements. Engagement 
needs to be two-way – not only imparting information from experts 
but getting information back from the community16 (session 39). 
Information exchange via the media presents significant challenges, 
The Importance of Behavioural Change
Prof. Diana Liverman, liverman@u.arizona.edu
BOX 14
Individual citizens can play an important role in the response to climate change, 
especially when they make decisions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions or adapt 
to climate change. Public support is also critical in the success of national and regional 
government actions, and public perceptions can impede the acceptance of mitigation 
technologies. There is considerable evidence that individual behavioural change can 
contribute to reductions in emissions, especially from households and transportation 
and when supported by government policies, incentives and private sector activities 
(see figure). Many of the lowest cost reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are in 
the residential sector, where the use of insulation, efficient appliances and lights, and 
information feedback from smart meters and utility bills can produce rapid reductions in 
energy demand at a net financial saving rather than cost (see Box 11). 
Behavioural and attitudinal changes are also important in terms of political and corporate 
leadership where, for example, business leaders and city mayors have made significant 
commitments to emission reductions that go far beyond national political obligations or 
simple cost-benefit analysis. In terms of adaptation, millions of farmers and herders have 
adjusted their practices to past climate shifts and are already making decisions in response 
to the onset of warming and other shifts associated with climate change. International 
policy needs to support, and be sure not to constrain, the agency of individuals to respond 
to climate change, and to recognise the importance of providing relevant information to 
citizens so that they can make informed decisions about supporting policies and changing 
their own behaviour16 (session 20)62,95.
58 % 27 % 3 % 12%
48 % 30 % 7 % 15 %
33 % 30 % 10 % 27 %
31 % 31 % 6 % 31 %
22 % 28 % 7 % 43 %
17 % 50 % 4 % 29 %
15 % 22 % 8 % 54 %
10 % 33 % 9 % 47 %
10 % 36 % 7 % 47 %
10 % 28 % 10 % 52 %
8 % 11 % 13 % 68 %
4 % 12 % 9 % 75 %
0
Reduced energy consumption in your home by turning things off more
Bought energy efficient light bulbs
Bought an energy efficient appliance
Decided to buy a product produced locally rather than one that has come from far away
Decided to travel in a more energy efficient way 
Talked to friends or family about global warming
I often do this
What Have You Done to Reduce Your Impact on Climate Change? 
(US & UK combined)
I do this from time to time I plan to do this in 6 months Have not done
20 40 60 80 100 0
Decided to travel a shorter distance
Looked for products that contribute less to global warming because of a TV or radio program 
Sought out information about global warming
Bought a product that contributes less to global warming specifically because of an advertisement
Bought “green energy” from your electricity supplier
Used a “carbon calculator” to assess your own contribution to global warming
20 40 60 80 100
Actions taken by Individuals to reduce their contribution to climate change. The data are based on a 
survey of 2734 citizens in the US and UK by Accountability, June 2007, What Assures Consumers on 
Climate Change? 94.
Cultures, Values & World Perspectives as Factors in Responding to Climate Change
Prof. Karen O’Brien, karen.obrien@sosgeo.uio.no and Prof. Thomas Heyd, heydt@uvic.ca
BOX 13
No climate change policy will receive the support it needs, either formally in the political 
arena or at the pragmatic day-to-day level, unless cultures, values and world perspectives 
are taken into account from the outset. The reasons are simple. First, not even the most 
sophisticated science-based information and risk assessments are necessarily received in 
the same sense as they are understood by those who produce them. Second, policies, in 
order to be effective, need to take into account the socio-culturally shaped setting that 
pre-dates the attempt to implement the policies. The following points underscore the 
significance of this main finding:
Information about climate change and local interpretations of risk assessments •	
are culturally mediated through particular emotional ways of reasoning, typical 
meaning-making processes, specific conceptions of landscape and climate 
variability and change, and idiosyncratic notions of mitigation of risk.
Local religious and spiritual beliefs, knowledge systems, understanding of •	
nature-society relationships, and values and ethics influence how individuals and 
communities perceive and respond to climate change. Climate change science 
must recognise these local and indigenous cultural and experiential contexts, 
and attempt to relate to them when fostering societal mitigation and adaptation 
activities.
The implementation of adaptation strategies can raise issues that cut across power •	
relations in existing situations of inequality, which may have unforeseen long-
term effects for individuals and communities. This calls for approaches that foster 
deliberation in open, democratic decision-making contexts. In other words, the social 
and cultural consequences of climate change responses must be assessed, including 
the question of “whose values count?”
Research on the role of culture, values, and worldviews in both the generation of and 
responses to climate change should become a top priority. The cultural and experiential 
dimensions of climate change must be integrated with more standard, systems-oriented 
research on climate change, and need to be included in both mitigation and adaptation 
research and implementation programs. This conclusion argues for a new, larger role for the 
social sciences and humanities in addressing the challenges of climate change, and suggests 
the need for a truly interdisciplinary and integrated research agenda that places climate 
change in a much richer and deeper societal context.
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however, as the climate change issue is often presented as one “great 
global warming debate” rather than a depiction of the convergent 
agreement in science and the complexities and subtleties in the science-
policy interface16 (sessions 53 & 54). 
Community-level responses to the climate change challenge can often 
be most effective if they are a blend of local knowledge and experience 
and expert input. Empowerment is a key concept, and is best achieved 
by carefully defining the purpose of stakeholder engagement and 
structuring the processes to allow full participation by community 
members. Moving from community engagement to community action 
– a common outcome of effective engagement – requires proactive 
considerations of the institutions, resources, and the technical assistance 
required to support action16 (session 54).
At national and global scales, economic instruments such as emissions 
pricing, and market-based approaches more generally, are centrally 
important. Additional approaches, however, may be required. For 
example, a nationally driven but globally coordinated investment strategy, 
perhaps building on the opportunity provided by the global financial 
crisis, could actively promote climate-friendly development pathways 
and achieve technology diffusion and emission reductions faster than 
would be achieved by market instruments alone. Given the urgency 
of the climate change challenge (Key Message 1), “front-loading” – 
for example, a big, immediate push for investment in efficiency and 
renewable energy systems – will likely be more effective than adopting 
a more gradualist approach16 (session 55). Other visionary approaches 
at the large regional or global scale may be required to transform the 
management of our relationship with the planetary environment. One 
such approach could be to consider a novel global division of land-use 
activities that would significantly improve the geographical pattern of 
food and fibre production, biodiversity protection, infrastructure and 
energy generation (Box 15). 
The challenge is equally great to transform the current international 
governance landscape from a set of individual regimes or governance 
systems to an innovative, integrated institutional architecture for Earth 
System governance. A successful strategy to build such an architecture 
should be multi-dimensional and carefully coordinated, building on a 
number of existing institutional arrangements: (i) other environmental 
regimes, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD; (ii) 
international trade and financial mechanisms, such as the World 
Trade Organization, WTO, and the World Bank; and (iii) development-
oriented organisations aimed at alleviating poverty, such as the 
Global Environmental Facility, GEF, and regional development banks. 
Ultimately, meeting the climate change challenge will require a mosaic 
of approaches designed to build an integrated system of governance16 
(session 48).
In democratic political systems, individual voters will only drive such 
transformative change – from pragmatic changes in neighbourhood 
practices to the construction of new multi-national energy and transport 
systems and the building of new institutional regimes – if their values 
are deep and strong enough to make hard, long-term decisions (Box 
13). Thus, no climate change policy will ultimately succeed unless 
cultures, worldviews and core values change in ways that support the 
development of effective policy and its implementation16 (sessions 54 
& 57) .
Scientific information, technologies and economic instruments are all 
part of the solution, but their interpretation and application are mediated 
through the cultures and worldviews of individuals and communities 
(Figure 18). Religious and spiritual beliefs, indigenous knowledge 
systems, understandings of nature-society relationships, values and 
ethics influence how individuals and communities perceive and respond 
to climate change16 (session 57). Ultimately these human dimensions of 
climate change will determine whether humanity eventually achieves 
the great transformation that is in sight at the beginning of the 21st 
century or whether humanity ends the century with a “miserable 
existence in a +5oC world”101.
Seek voters´ support, dependent on media, 
next election is the reference point
Have more interest in structural adaptation 
options because they are easier to “sell” to 
the electorate.
POLITICIANS / LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ADMINISTRATION / BUREAUCRACY
RESEARCHERS
PUBLIC OPINION / MEDIA
ADVOCACY / INTEREST GROUPS
Focuses on implementation, engineering 
approaches
Hierarchical, often follows outdated 
procedures
Does not directly respond to pressure from 
other groups;
Often involved in power and competencies 
conflicts
Theoretically oriented, not practical, not 
aware of local condition or social dynamics
Often function only within one discipline, 
pursue only their discipline’s point of view 
(”free trade and putting price on scarce 
resources can solve all problems”)
Allocates responsibility to the government
Seen as not aware of climate change 
impacts, not aware of their choices.
Normative points of view (e.g. “space to 
rivers”, “plant trees in each unused space”)
Supported by facts or beliefs (”water is from 
God”)
Figure 18
Groups of shared mental models. Mental models vary across different groups in society and affect 
how people perceive the climate change issue; they are hard to change and can create barriers to 
communication and action99. Thus, a critical challenge to dealing effectively with climate change is to 
build consensus across society on the nature of the climate change threat and the overall strategy to deal 
with it. In effect, a single, high-level mental model – or perspective – needs to be achieved. Without it, 
effective climate and policy action will be unlikely.
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Towards a Great Land-Use Transformation?
Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, John@pik-potsdam.de & Veronika Huber huber@pik-potsdam.de
BOX 15
Keeping global warming below 2°C will require all our ingenuity for the climate-smart 
evolution of existing structures, yet large-scale transformational measures will also 
be needed. In particular, the current planetary land-use pattern may have to change 
fundamentally, as it is the sub-optimal result of erratic historical processes that were blind 
to global sustainability considerations. Future land-use on Earth must accommodate 
multiple competing demands for food and fibre, energy, services, infrastructure and 
conservation by some 9 billion people – on a non-expandable global surface. Novel 
challenges like the creation of artificial carbon sinks through bio-sequestration may 
have to be met in order to avoid dangerous climate change96.
Science needs to demonstrate (i) what an “optimal” land-use pattern might look 
like; (ii) that this pattern would warrant the generation of sufficient quantities of the 
desired functions and resources; and (iii) which sociopolitical strategies can realise the 
envisioned transformation in good time. The international research community is just 
beginning to address such issues, yet certain insights concerning the first two aspects 
are already available.
For instance, the German Global Change Advisory Council (WBGU) has recently published 
various reports that identify those areas on Earth that should be dedicated to biodiversity 
support, biomass production, and renewable energy harvesting, respectively97. One 
important conclusion is that the afforestation of degraded land can tap a sustainable 
bioenergy potential of around 100 Exajoules. Analyses led by the Potsdam Institute98 
also indicate that 12 billion people with 1995 dietary habits could be nourished on less 
than one third of the present agricultural area – if the best sites were used for the most 
appropriate crops and if world food trade would operate undistorted by protectionism. This 
bold approach would only become feasible, however, if the prime locations (as shown in the 
figure) would be reclaimed/reserved for agriculture as part of a long-term global deal – in 
the same way as the tropical rainforests hopefully will be earmarked for conservation as part 
of the global commons.
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Ranking of world-wide locations according to suitability for food production under current management practices (adopted from98). The red ellipses mark the prime regions to be considered as “global 
agricultural commons”. 
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THE PATH AHEAD
Many past environmental problems were solved when humans realised 
that their own activities were leading to consequences deleterious to 
their health and well-being. They responded by changing behaviour and 
developing new technologies. Will our contemporary society respond in 
a similar way to the climate change challenge now facing us? Climate 
change is fundamentally different from the environmental problems 
humanity has dealt with until now. The risks, scales and uncertainties 
associated with climate change are enormous and there is a significant 
probability of a devastating outcome at the global scale.
The nature of the climate change challenge demands visionary and 
innovative thinking. The planetary boundaries concept100, which aims 
to define the “safe operating space” for humanity, draws on the 
earlier experience of societies that regulated their own behaviour when 
knowledge of undesirable consequences became available. Planetary 
boundaries are defined with respect to biophysical thresholds of the 
Earth, the crossing of which would lead to catastrophic outcomes for 
societies (see tipping elements, Key Message 2). The scientific evidence 
strongly suggests that there is an upper limit for the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, or a “climate change boundary”, 
within which humanity should operate to reduce the risks of catastrophic 
outcomes. Although the precise position is not yet known, current 
evidence indicates that humanity is fast approaching or may even 
have exceeded the boundary16. Thus, the need for rapid and drastic 
reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases is urgent if serious 
climate impacts are to be avoided.
Living within a challenging climate change boundary can often seem 
overwhelmingly difficult. There is no single treaty or technological “silver 
bullet” that will quickly and painlessly transform contemporary society. 
A transformation to a society living within the climate change boundary 
will take time and will require commitment from all levels and members 
of society. As a starting point, long-term targets for emission reductions 
are essential if society wishes to reduce the risk of dangerous climate 
change to acceptable levels. Trajectories provide guideposts along the 
way to meeting the targets, but there are many possible pathways that 
humanity could follow which would allow it to remain within the overall 
climate change boundary.   
Thus, in 2009 society cannot precisely determine the “right” or the “best” 
pathway all the way to 2050 and beyond. There will be technological, 
societal and value changes in the future that will cause the trajectory to 
change. There should be no penalty for not getting it absolutely right 
the first time. The most important task is to start the journey now. The 
first steps are to generate a broad dialogue at all levels of society and 
to build a consensus on the need to act. Quite probably, when it comes 
to responding to human-made climate change, the “only action that is 
inexcusable is to take no action at all”101.   
This synthesis, which is based on the discussions at and outcomes of the 
IARU International Scientific Congress Climate Change: Global Risks, 
Challenges & Decisions, summarises the most up-to-date knowledge on 
climate change from the research community – natural scientists, social 
scientists, economists, engineers and humanities scholars. The evidence 
that human activities are changing the fundamental conditions for 
life on Earth is overwhelming, and the challenges presented by these 
changes are daunting. Postponing action will only increase the risks to 
future generations. While no single meeting can transform our society 
to one living within the climate change boundary, the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference, COP15, to be held in December 2009 
offers a unique and timely opportunity to start such a transformative 
journey. Many are hoping that if society is successful in meeting the 
climate change challenge, future generations will read in their history 
books that COP15 was where the journey really began.
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